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TRIAL PROCEDURE: A COMPOSITION ANALYZING
SOME OF THE ELEMENTS
By JOHN L. HILLt
I. INTRODUCTION
In April, 1968, Senator Joseph D. Tydings introduced legislation in an
attempt to deal with some of the problems arising from modern aircraft
crashes. Basically the legislation would provide a uniform body of federal
law to apply to all aviation activities and provide exclusive federal juris-
diction for those aircraft crashes which ordinarily involve substantial
numbers of people and suits in multiple courts.
Under Section 1407 of Title 28, United States Code, passed in 1968,
the judicial panel for multiple litigation has the power to transfer aircraft
disaster cases filed in federal court for pre-trial purposes to a single dis-
trict, and this power has been frequently exercised. Remand to the dis-
trict from which the case was transferred is required after the completion
of the pre-trial on the common questions of tort.
Of course, transfer under § 1404 (a),' or the so-called "Forum Non-
Convenience" transfers, are still available as far as aircraft suits filed in
federal courts are concerned, but the doctrine is limited to transferring
only to any district or division where suit might have been brought.
The judicial panel for multiple litigation referred to above is authorized
to select the central point for transfer and to send a judge to preside in
any sensitive depositions. The panel has dealt with a group of cases which
grew out of the American Flyer Airline Corporation crash near Ardmore,
Oklahoma, in which 82 were killed and the remainder seriously injured;
the July, 1967, Boeing 727 collision with a private aircraft near Hender-
sonville, North Carolina; a group of cases arising out of the crash of Thai
Airways at the Hong Kong Airport. Under submission now before the
panel is a group of cases resulting from the Braniff Airways crash near
Falls City, Nebraska. Aircraft disaster cases constitute about a third of the
multiple trial docket o nthe basis of experience to date.
I feel it is fair to say that the presently pending Tydings' Bill is consider-
ed unnecessary and undesirable by most lawyers familiar with aviation liti-
gation. In my opinion, there is no great need for it. The present judicial
machinery, both state and federal, generally functions well in handling
the problem. The primary difficulty in the conflicts of law area has been
t Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas. Preparatory Education, Kilgore College; LL.B. (1947),
University of Texas; Texas Trial Lawyers Association (Pres., 1955); American Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation (Member, Board of Directors, 1964-1965); International Academy.of Trial Lawyers (Mem-
ber, Board of Directors, 1963-1965).
'28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1966).
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state laws limiting recoveries for wrongful death. These laws are being
repealed in recent years and only a few remaining states now have such
limitations. As has been pointed out in other presentations here, there has
been a revolution in choice of law principles which has permitted state
courts much greater flexibility in applying reasonable law to these situa-
tions. This is not to suggest, however, that problems do not exist in multi-
plaintiff major aircraft disaster situations.
For one thing-it will be infrequent when the evidence in an aircraft
disaster will point solely to one party as the liable culprit. Frequently the
disasters have been the culmination of a series of mishaps and errors at-
tributable to a number of different people-the crew, the air carrier's
maintenace personnel, the Government Air Traffic Controllers or the air
frame or parts manufacturer. This does obviously present the problems
discussed by a previous speaker of who should be sued, where they can be
sued, how they should be sued and how to place the blame, if any,
where it belongs. Should all the cases be filed in the same court? Should
all be filed for discovery? However, it has been my experience in multi-
plaintiff air crash situations that sensible and co-operative efforts at solving
these questions have usually been made by all attorneys for the litigation.
Deciding on who to sue, when, and where, conducting voluntary consoli-
dated discovery efforts and agreement to the trial of a test case has not been
difficult among the lawyers, plaintiff and defendant alike, with whom I
have dealt in multi-litigation situations. Contrary to popular belief, law-
yers want our system of justice to work. Lawyers want speedy and fair
disposition of our legal business in this country.
For example, in the Idlewild Accident of 1962, by the process of re-
moval and transfer the lawyers were successful in placing all the suits for
damages and wrongful death before Judge Alfuzzo sitting in the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York. One case was tried,
Ingram v. Eastern Airlines and the United States of America,' and after
his findings were affirmed by the appelate courts, all litigation arising out
of the accident was settled. In the Jones Beach accident of February, 1969,
all suits were collected in the same court before Judge Rayfill by means
of removal and transfer-and I understand all of the cases have now been
settled or are in the process of being settled. In the Mt. Fuju, Japan, crash
of 1966, settlements were consummated within one year after the crash
without the necessity of the formal intervention of the judicial panel for
multi-district litigation. In the Buffalo, Texas, crash of 1959, almost all of
the cases were handled in the state court of Houston, Texas, and after the
trial of one test case, all other cases were settled. In the more recent Daw-
son, Texas, crash, most of the cases were settled within a year and a half,
voluntary consolidated discovery was conducted with co-operation from
all parties, and no case has yet been tried.
There is a temptation in these situations to sit around and wait for
someone else to start the ball rolling. While it is good to find out which of
'Inghfram v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 Av. Cas, 18,170 (E.D,N.Y. 1966).
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your fellow lawyers have which companion cases and to offer your co-
operation and try to divide up some of the work, it is not wise to depend
on someone else to get the game underway. I believe in going to the scene
of the accident regardless of the lapse of time since the crash. I like to
talk to witnesses; get a feel of the situation. You may learn very little of
a concrete nature but it will probably help you later in the taking of
depositions and in trying the case.
If the public hearings have already been held, order a copy of the trans-
cript and exhibits and board findings and read this material thoroughly.
Begin the preparation of interrogatories and request for admission and
motions for production based upon the N.T.S.B. file. Start defining your
probable deposition witnesses. Get your request for admission out of the
way prior to depositions; move by co-operation and agreement wherever
possible. Be reasonable and considerate, but do not tolerate unreasonable
delay on the part of other plaintiffs' counsel or defense counsel.
Work out an equitable agreement among your various clients as to the
ultimate sharing of expenses. Expand this to other plaintiffs' lawyers with
other clients arising from the same accident. These agreements are not
hard to make. There is a guide-be fair!
As I said, talk to the other lawyers as to where they intend to file their
case or cases. Tell them where you intend to file yours and why. Tell them
who you intend to sue and why, and get their views as to prospective de-
fendants. As a matter of courtesy, notify the other lawyers of any deposi-
tions you take by commission and try to make an agreement as to all
depositions taken so that they can be used in any case arising from the
crash, filed or to be filed.
In the Buffalo, Texas, crash of 1959, I filed all the cases in state court
in Houston, Texas. They were not consolidated. One case was tried with
a favorable plaintiff's verdict against the frame manufacturer and the
engine manufacturer. There was no appeal, and all other cases were settled.
The Dawson, Texas, crash of 1968, and as of this date, all but three for
which I have responsibility have been settled. In the Wein Consolidated
air crash in Alaska in 1960, the cases are in Alaska state court. I have
contributed $500 to the expense pot and we are waiting for the public
report of the N.T.S.B.
In the VIASA crash at Mariciabo of relatively recent date, I have filed
two suits in the Federal District Court of Corpus Christi, and I suspect we
are headed for handling under Section 1407.
Some points that can effect venue and jurisdiction questions are: (1)
the required diversity of citizenship is between all parties plaintiff and all
parties defendant; if one of multiple defendants has the same citizenship
as one of the multi parties plaintiff, the federal court has no jurisdiction;
(2) the Federal Tort Claims Act relating to suits against the United States
(where the government is a necessary defendant) requires such an action
to be brought where the plaintiff resides or where the accident took place
'Federal Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1966).
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[28 U.S.C. § 1402]; (3) suits under the Death on the High Seas Act are
to be filed in federal court; (4) most general aviation litigation may be
originally instituted in any state court of general jurisdiction in any state
in which defendants are suable under the laws of the state in which the
suit is filed or, where complete diversity exists, in most federal district
courts in the country. [See International Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 estab-
lishing "minimal contacts" rule.] (5) removal from state to federal court
cannot be accomplished if one defendant is properly sued in the state
court; and (6) transfers from one federal district to another under §
1404 (a) should not be ordered unless the balance is strongly in favor of
defendant as shown by clear and convincing evidence.
II. PLEADINGS
Ideally, plaintiff's counsel should know the probably liable defendant or
defendants prior to filing suit. In the Lawson, Texas, crash, I felt sure in
my own mind within a very short time afterwards that it was probably a
pure and simple case of operational neglect. My opinion was that the
airline was liable and probably solely so. In such a situation, I personally
feel that the airline alone should be sued by the plaintiff and my pleadings
were so cast. Other plaintiff counsel entered suit against the airline and
the manufacturer. For months I was cajoled by counsel for the airline to
amend my pleadings and join the manufacturer as a defendant but I re-
fused to do so. As I suspected they would, the airline filed a cross-action
in my cases against the manufacturer. A portion of the pleadings utilized
are as follows:
IV. In the vicinity of Dawson, Texas, on May 3, 1968, this Lockheed Electra
airplane was involved in a mid-air breakup and crash which resulted in the
death of the deceased. Braniff Airways Incorporated owed the highest degree
of care to the deceased to safely transport him to his destination, which duty
was negligently breached. The airplane crash was due to the negligence and
gross negligence of Braniff Airways Incorporated, and such negligence was a
proximate cause of the death of the deceased. Further, plaintiffs allege that
the airplane involved in this crash was at the time of its mid-air breakup
within the exclusive control of the defendant, Braniff, its agents and em-
ployees, and ordinarily would not have broken up and crashed had it not
been negligently controlled and operated. This being the type of occurrence
that would not have ordinarily happened but for Braniff's negligence, it is
an appropriate case under the law for application of the legal doctrine known
as res ipsa loquitur, or "the thing speaks for itself," and the plaintiffs here
and now give notice to the defendant of their intentions to rely upon that
doctrine as well as their allegations of negligence and gross negligence. Plain-
tiffs further allege that Braniff warranted and represented that the aircraft in
question was suitable for the purpose for which it was being used, that such
express and implied warranties were breached on the occasion in question and
were a proximate cause of the death of the deceased.
V. Subsequent to the filing of this suit against Braniff, on or about July
23, 1968, Braniff did thereafter on or about January 17, 1969, file herein a
third part action against Lockheed. In such third party action, Braniff re-
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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quests indemnity and contribution from Lockheed for any damages assessed
against Braniff herein. Further, Braniff alleges that the crash in question was
caused by failure of the aircraft in flight which was due to structural de-
fects, imperfections and deficiencies which were caused by the negligence of
Lockheed. Further, Braniff alleges that "the true facts are that the Electra
airplane proved to be clearly defective and unsafe for the purpose of flight
and transportation of passengers" as warranted by Lockheed and that Lock-
heed breached both express and implied warranties of merchantability and
suitability of the aircraft for purposes of which it was manufactured and
sold. Further, Braniff alleges that the plane failed in flight due to a defective
condition caused by Lockheed's negligence and breach of warranty and that
such defect rendered the aircraft unreasonably dangerous to Braniff and the
passengers thereon.
While still insisting that the crash in question resulted from the negligence,
gross negligence, and breach of implied and expressed warranties on the part
of Braniff, in order that all possible responsibile parties may be fully before
the court and jury for purposes of final judgment herein, plaintiffs adopt
the allegations of negligence and breach of warranty in Braniff's third party
action against Lockheed.
Personally, I much prefer my trial posture and options over those who
initially sued both the airline and manufacturer alleging affirmative specific
negligence against both.
In the Buffalo, Texas, crash proof of negligence and cause was very
difficult. Great expense and lengthy discovery preceded development of
facts which indicated joint liability between the air frame manu-
facturer and the maker of the engines. I had sued both defendants as well
as the airline. At trial time I probably should have dismissed the airline
because I knew the case against it was weak. I simply didn't have the
guts to do it. I ended up with the defendants being given 24 jury strikes
against my six. Needless to say, they "consulted" with reference to their
preemptory challenge. That I obtained a fair jury was a modern day
miracle. This experience-although not costly in that instance-reinforced
my conviction to sue only the primary culprit in a situation where you
have a pretty good idea of his identity. Sometimes these "third-party"
defendants brought in later by the primary culprit can be very coopera-
tive with and helpful to the plaintiff. At least you haven't "driven them
into the arms" of the other defendant and you retain some options.
As to the form of pleadings, I like to "tell the story." If I can't "tell
it like it is" going in, I amend and do so as soon as possible. Let me give
you an example.
The aircraft in question suffered a structural breakup in mid-air initiated
by the structural failure of the right wing. There was no lightning strike,
hail strike or explosion which initiated the right wing failure. The testimony
of the Braniff experts assigns the cause of the initial failure to (1) an upset
of the aircraft; (2) structural and/or design deficiency of the right wing.
Braniff admits that 'but for' the upset of the aircraft the accident would not
have occurred.
The upset immediately followed the efforts of the pilot of the plane to
negotiate a 1800 turn in order to turn away from severe weather conditions
that were in his flight path. Normally, the Electra aircraft would not upset
1970]
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if such a maneuver is properly carried out. Such an upset is an abnormal
occurrence and normally will not occur if the aircraft is being properly
controlled. Needless to say, the loss of a wing in flight is a highly unusual
occurrence.
Braniff owed to the deceased a high degree of care.
Braniff was in complete control of the aircraft.
Braniff, under their own testimony and without regard to their wreckless-
ness in deliberately penetrating a severe storm, stands convicted of negligence
which was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff. Any finding
to the contrary would have no evidence to sustain it.
He was a loving and protecting husband and a devoted father and son and
provided plaintiffs with financial support as well as providing them with care,
council, protection, advance, moral and mental training, guidance, nurture
and education.
The deceased would have continued to provide guidance, attention, train-
ing, education, counsel, care, nurture and protection to your plaintiffs
throughout his normal span of life but for his untimely and tragic death.
He was only thirty-eight (38) years of age and had a life expectancy of
approximately 33.6 years, according to the 1964 U. S. life tables.
Finally, I have a check list which I look over in connection with negli-
gence allegations.
(1) Violation of civil air regulations.
(a) formerly promulgated by F.A.A.
(b) Admissible in evidence as "establishing impartial and authoritative
criteria"5 for determining negligence and as "establishing the proper standard
of care under the circumstances."'
(2) Violation of manual provisions.
(a) Airlines own rules and procedures.
(b) Violations may be evidence of negligence.
(Citrola case).
(3) Improper control, improper lookout, errors of judgment, flying into
storm, deviation from route, failure to consider weather, failure to warn crew
concerning weather, employment of incompetent or insufficiently trained
crew, using known, defective or inadequate equipment, failure to inspect,
maintain and overhaul equipment and overloading.
(4) Manufacturer's liability for negligence.
(a) Faulty manufacture-defective fuel pump.
(b) Hooking up controls improperly.
(c) Bad welding.
(d) Omitting to install safety wire.
(e) Failure to inspect.
(f) Faulty design.
(g) Failure to warn (continuing duty to warn and make changes) with
service bulletins and airworthiness directives.
(h) Failure to instruct (maintenance and operation manuals).
(5) For breach of warranty---express or implied (see my article on
privity).
(6) They are liable for negligence-failure to maintain and repair, failure
to inspect-failure to warn, and probably breach of warranty.
(7) Liability of airport owners and operators:
'Prosper v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910(1958).
8Citrola v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
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As to private-can be liable for such things as rough runways, obstructions
on runways, insufficient lighting.
III. DISCOVERY
In all events a thorough review of the N.T.S.B. transcripts, exhibits and
reports is a must. This must be a personal review by leading trial counsel.
As previously indicated, it is my practice to frame written interrogatories
and request for admission of relevant facts as I wade through this vol-
uminous material. Normally it is about a two weeks job, but you must
not short-cut this responsibility.
There is usually no need to file these interrogatories and motions in
each of your cases. Just file them in the one you intend to try first. I have
never had opposing counsel refuse to agree that they may be considered as
having been filed in all cases.
Where necessary, supplement your interrogatories and requests for ad-
mission with a motion to produce and inspect. In this connection, most
modern courts hold that it is proper to ask for production of any docu-
ments in the possession of the adversary which fall into a described cate-
gory. It is not necessary that the moving party describe any particular
document or even have knowledge that the adversary in fact has docu-
ments in a described category.7 An example would be "all documents,
memos, correspondence, drawings and other writings directly or indirectly
relating to the design of the Electra aircraft." Also, as stated previously,
write a letter to the airlines requesting that they preserve the wreckage
and that they grant you and your representative an early opportunity to
inspect.
IV. DEPOSITIONS
N.T.S.B. investigators can be forced to testify in civil litigation,
701 (2) of the Federal Aviation Act8 notwithstanding, so long as the testi-
mony is limited to matters of fact as distinguished from opinions and
conclusions. By way of courtesy, the testimony of such persons is usually
by way of deposition and the courts will usually accept such testimony
in lieu of personal appearance. Arrangements for the depositions should
be made thorugh the general counsel of the FAA, and time and place on
a voluntary basis with opposing counsel and all concerned.
In my view, the enormous responsibility placed upon trial counsel in a
multi-plaintiff air crash case requires that he personally prepare the case
if he is going to try it, and in particular, it requires him to personally take
all key depositions.
What has been referred to as "saturation" is sometimes employed by
plaintiff's counsel who, although possessing impressive technical qualifica-
tions in aviation matters, lack trial experience and do not question the
witness so as to develop a usable and understandable deposition for trial
7See 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 34.07, at 2998 (2d ed. 1953).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958).
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use. This should be avoided. Depositions should be taken with a view to
their actual use in trial. If possible, all lawyers involved should agree on
a "lead" counsel in the taking of depositions, reserving the right to each
counsel to supplement questions if he feels it necessary. This is one of the
toughest problems I face in multi-plaintiff aircraft cases, because I am
afraid most trial lawyers are prima donnas and most of us don't enjoy the
second chair.
In all events, be sure to work out an agreement binding on all parties
and counsel that the depositions will be filed in the papers in one case
(usually the one you have picked out to try first) and that they may be
used in all cases filed or to be filed arising from the disaster. Also, have a
clear understanding as to how long the witness will have in which to re-
view, correct and sign the deposition. Otherwise, you can come down to
trial time with many depositions still not actually filed for use.
I have always been able to work out an agreement prior to depositions
to waive all objections as to substance until the time of trial and obtaining
such an agreement is absolutely vital to speeding up the proceedings.
The manner and way in which you use these depositions upon trial can
be very important.
In the trial of the Buffalo, Texas, crash, every time that I offered
a few "juicy" excerpts from a deposition, the defendants would exercise
their privilege to offer all other "relevant" portions of the deposition and
this usually meant that they read the entire deposition. This was very
boring to the jury, as I am sure was defendants' wish. These depositions
were hundreds of pages long and took days-not hours-to read. By this
method, defense counsel was making me pay a terrible price for the intro-
duction of the "guts" of the deposition which were essential for plaintiff's
prima facie case. I moaned and I groaned and I pleaded with the court
to defer defendant counsel's reading of "cross-examination" until plain-
tiff rested-but to no avail. Finally, I quit reading depositions and started
calling the defendants' designated agents to the stand as live witnesses
under the adverse witness rule. This had the desired effect. Defendants
agreed that if I would not call any more of their witnesses live in my
cases they would permit me to read my little excerpted "gems" from the
various depositions without any additional reading by them.
Absent such an agreement, plaintiff is probably better off to read the
entire deposition offered from cover to cover-under the adverse witness
rule, of course. At least, that way you continue to carry the ball. You
control the volume and crescendos of voice. Even then, it is pretty painful
and boring, believe me. But it is better than letting defense counsel occupy
center stage for several hours while you sit there and suffer in silence.
V. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Each case should be settled strictly on its own merits. Negotiations
should be conducted on the highest authority level-face to face. All
attempts to lump cases together for settlement should be discouraged. A
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full settlement brochure for each case should be submitted to defense
council following the taking of the widow's deposition. There should be
included in a typical brochure photographs of the entire family, copies of
withholding statements, tax returns, accountant's reports and audits, letters
and other documentary proof of the character, industry and ability of
the decedent, and a biographical sketch summarizing the family history,
education, employment record and prospects for increased earnings.
Acturial testimony should be prepared by a competent actuary and made
a part of the brochure.
In the case of a self-employed decedent, present an evaluation of loss
of estate and inheritance by accountants and economists in line with
O'Toole v. United States'
While there are instances when aviation cases are tried even when lia-
bility is clear, most clear liability cases are settled. When liability is not
clear or the proportionate fault of multiple defendants is seriously in
dispute, at least one trial is usually inevitable. In such a situation, the
question arises as to whether to consolidate the various cases for trial as
opposed to trying a single test case.
From the plaintiff's standpoint, I never favor consolidation for trial
purposes. I simply feel that each family is entitled to its separate day in
court and will usually fare better on damages if theirs is the only case
being tried. Also, once a verdict is rendered, in favor of any one plaintiff,
it may constitute an estoppel by judgment as to all remaining cases.
VI. JURY SUMMATION
I have always believed in stressing damages in jury argument. You should
cover liaiblity but save the majority of your time to discuss damages.
The Buffalo, Texas, trial which involved a widow, four minor children
and the parents as plaintiffs presents a good example of this concept of
discussing damages."
You should return to damages after discussing the broad aspects of
liability. You may solve all of your multitude of problems dealing with
liability in a multi-plaintiff air crash case, but the ultimate profit depends
upon whether an adequate award was returned and never lose sight of that
basic objective.
9242 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1957).
"United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub nom,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951
(1965). See also Dewitt v. Han, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967) (applying estoppel
"offensively"); but see Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965).
" The following is the first part of my jury arguments in the Buffalo, Texas, crash of 1959:
"May it please your honor, and may it please you ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I can't begin
to tell you ladies and gentlemen the awful burden that the responsibility of this case has been for
me personally. I am sure that perhaps a lawyer with more years back of him could have shouldered
that responsibility better. I must confess that at times during the last two years I came near my
breaking point. However, I have been comforted with the fact that there would come a time when
the obvious truth and simplicity of what had happened in this great tragedy was presented to a
jury of twelve free Americans-twelve fair and impartial people-that the pretense and smokescreen
and pretended complexity and technicality of this defense would be exposed. Now, I come back to
you now and ask you again, as fair and impartial people, to do your job and let the chips fall
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where they may. You do your job, as sworn by your oath to do, and I think we will see a just
end to this sordid chapter in American aviation. My plea again, ladies and gentlemen, is to insist
upon a legal standard of damages, and a full legal standard of damages, for each of the plaintiffs
who stands before you here in this case. I have previously talked at some length about the propriety
of this and the legal reasons for this. I ask you again to apply, as you promised us you would when
we carefully selected each and every one of you to serve on this jury, to apply in a full measure
the legal applicable test for each of these children, this good mother of those children, and this
mother and father of the deceased.
I am glad the two older children were down here for the trial. I asked them to be here because
I want them to hear what I have to say in their daddy's case and to see what happens in the trial
of their daddy's case. They are big enough to know. They oughtn't to have somebody else tell them
about it. Now, the little ones, they will be told soon enough. And I want them to be told some
day that the law of their daddy's case said that each and every individual child, each creature of
God, each flesh and blood child, was entitled to have his loss measured separately, fully and com-
pletely. This isn't my law. This isn't Lockheed Aircraft from California's law nor General Motors'
from Indianapolis law. This is Texas law given to you in instruction by this court. And the only
reason that the children's issue is encompassed in one special issue is because, obviously, the standard
and applicable language is the same, but the judge gives you a separate place to answer for each
individual child in this case. And I ask you to make these answers, first on behalf of Jerry, that
little fellow that I held in my arms here in the courtroom and who will be back here when you
return with the verdict that, I believe, will be a living legal monument to the father that he lost
and which verdict will, I believe, demonstrate that what his daddy gave for everyone of us when
he was over enemy territory in fighter planes and what he stood for as an American all through
his life-this verdict will demonstrate that he was not fighting for cut-rate American justice.
I ask you on behalf of Mark, who is not here, that little namesake of Admiral Mitchner who
thought so much of his daddy-to make a full answer for him. I can't help but feel that if that
boy's daddy could walk in here now he would say to all of us 'be fair and right about the Ameri-
can principles that I wanted my life to stand for.' Give a full answer, ladies and gentlemen, to
this little Mark, who has already been knocked to his knees from this loss-had one year cut and
carved straight out of his life-set back in school through the loss of this care, nurture and
guidance that I have talked about and that is so important to a child and which when taken away
can make a tremendous difference in that child's life.
And I ask you to answer fully on behalf of Suzy, just a year older, who was hit so hard by
this tragedy. And I haven't tried to embellish this matter-I don't want to win lawsuits parading
children before juries. Everyone knows Suzy's loss is tremendous. A little girl at that age-there
is a tremendous reaction between a child of that age and her daddy and I appeal for Suzy on her
own individual personal behalf because you must do this as though each one of these children were
the only living party before you. As I said before, it is not a question of what it adds up to and
you promised faithfully, and we accepted you upon this jury with the promise, faithfully made
and faithfully accepted that overall amounts were not going to control your judgments; that you
were going to take each one of these children and give them each a square and full and fair deal
so that the money awarded to each could be put in the hands of this fine court to the end that
he could do with it at least half of the things that Charles Quick could have done for each one
of these children but for the negligence that was proved in this courthouse. And don't cut it down
and don't compromise. And let me say this further thing about these two sitting here. God bless
them, they exemplify the type of Christian, God-fearing attitudes and moral character that Charles
Quick was capable of building into a child. Thank God they got enough of it before their daddy
was taken away from them. This young fellow sitting here was 12-oh, he looks a little older
now, but you know 30 months, 31,600 hours, millions of minutes, God knows how many seconds,
go pretty quick when you just talk about it in a courtroom. But this young man has lived it.
He has lived it from the day that they put away the few remains right up until this good day,
and he has lived it like a man. And he has had to become a man at a young age. His sister is just
like him. She has a few problems that any pretty teenage girl has, many of which a daddy can
help on, I guarantee you that. Decisions are made at this time of life that can ruin children. But
I know that this girl got enough from her daddy to demonstrate-oh, she didn't get what God
meant for her to have, what the law meant for her to have, but it is to be pointed out if there
was ever a living illustration that makes it unnecessary to guess and wonder about the pecuniary
value of Charles Quick's care, nurture and guidance, it abides in this fine young girl.
Let me say a word now for one of the most deserving, one of the most regular, one of the
most down to earth, one of the finest women that God ever made. A person who, like so many
fine American women, stuck with their man, worked with their man, and loved their man. Not
too proud to get her husband the type of education that he wanted for every one of his kids and
in a better degree and more of it. And who, as she came finally to a little of the 'queenly' side
of life, had it all knocked out from under her and taken away.
And I don't forget to speak a word again for these fine folks from Cowtown, the parents of
Charles Quick. There is bound to have been some real upbringing to produce that kind of a man
and you will remember Mrs. Quick's testimony to the very deep interest that son took, as any
good son would, in his parents.
Now, I realize at this point that, like the airlines when they proved up the value of their lost
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plane, we have no bill of sale on Charles Quick. We cannot demand a stipulation as to his value.
But I have not the slightest doubt but what that man, through his normal life expectancy, would
have accumulated in cold dollars and cents in excess [would be?] of what we have here sought.
When one asks what was he worth to himself and to his family and considers the various elements
of damage in this court's charge that transcend the accumulation of dollars and cents, the overall
amount of what we seek comes very well in focus. And since when, may I ask, has the time come
when the wrongdoer in the courtrooms seeks to cast a greater burden on the innocent than the law
imposes? Since when is it for the wrongdoer to say, 'Oh, he wouldn't have progressed very much,
do you think?' Since when? Also, a man or a lawyer that comes to the courtroom and would
say or suggest that care, nurture and guidance and expected increased earnings are not compensable
items by a jury stands utterly alone and without precedence and without law or anything else
to back him up. You jurors must look, and I know you will, into the language of this charge
to see what the law says about that, and not be misled by someone speaking in the interest of de-
fending an important client. Indeed, the law has been centuries, working through great judicial
minds and great courts, forging out for us the elements that best express these human losses, the
elements that are and must be considered by the jury in wrongful death actions. The mere fact
that there are just three of them, and that you exclude grief and mental anguish and pain and
express the pecuniary loss in terms of care, nurture and guidance doesn't make the elements less
important. It makes them more important. They have behind them the standing and tradition of
the law that these were the elements upon which the evidence can be brought in and these are
the elements that do have great pecuniary value and these are the elements that best say and express
what the real loss is. Loss of society? No. But care-that's it. That's an element that can be shown
and demonstrated to be related to pecuniary loss and so this, the law says, we will use. So it is
with nurture. And so it is with guidance. And remember, these are three separate and distinct
items of pecuniary value and loss to these young children and for which we are asking you to
place a money value on. And it would be cruel to the extreme, ladies and gentlemen, for anyone
to say, 'Well, since we don't have any direct evidence on the value of these items, we must strip
ourselves of our good judgment and common sense which would make it imperative that we do
truly evaluate these items in their full pecuniary measure.' You are the exclusive judges of the
value to be placed upon these elements. The court cannot add one dime to your verdict. No, when
you have said what the value of the painstaking, deliberate care that a parent gives to a child,
this court cannot add to that deliberation. When you have said what it is worth for a true parent
to nurture a child as we nurture plants with water and trees with food, the court cannot add to
that deliberation. The same is true as to the guidance. I will never forget the time when I got
lost down by the Sabine River when I was about 9 years old. I remember how I longed and
pained for a guide. A sign telling me which way to go. Later, in the Navy, as we sailed our little
amphibious ships, we needed the navigators; the people to plot the course. We all need the guidance
of loving parents, and the need is with us always.
Then, you come over here to the support, maintenance and education items to be considered
by you under the court's charge. The evidence here shows that Charles Quick wanted, above all
else, for each of his children to have a good education. Such an obligation doesn't necessarily end
at age twenty-one. The support and maintenance of a child doesn't necessarily and automatically
cut off at any particular period and in considering these cold, bread and butter matters, we would
be doing a great injustice were we not to consider not only the past earnings of Mr. Quick but
the anticipated earnings. The standard of the law is uniform, but varies in its application from
case to case. Obviously, it would be manifestly unjust and wrong for a man to be wrongly and
negligently taken in the bloom of life and then for us to say, 'Well, we don't consider the tre-
mendous future that that person probably had, because to do so would be to speculate.' What is
life all about except the hopes that all of us have for the future; the hopes for our wives; the
hopes for men; the hopes for our children. Would it be proper to strike out a man's life that
was making ten or eleven thousand dollars a year and although the record showed that that man
was progressing and would in all reasonable probability continue to make increased earnings through
his work life, and then just freeze him in his tracks and take away from his family all that he
could have probably earned through that life expectancy; because such an attitude would be
wrong, the court has placed in this charge the words 'anticipated earnings' for you to consider
under this particular record, and your judgment must be based upon the reasonable probabilities
reflected by that record.
These losses that I have already discussed are so impressive that it makes other elements which
are included in the court's charge, and which are extremely important in and of themselves, begin
to appear as eyewash. The services that a husband gives a wife are to be accounted for in your
verdict. The repairs, the painting, the fixing, the yardwork-these are some of the more obvious
ones but I know I don't have to draw a word picture to an intelligent jury concerning the services
of a good husband to his wife. Neither must I dwell at length on the care and counsel which
this record reveals was so appreciated by Mrs. Quick and so freely given by her husband. I'm
not talking about replacing the poem which he wrote or the loss of society, but the care, or the
protection, if you please, which is a part of care. Yes, it is good to have a man around the house.
Would I be criticized to suggest that such an item is worth a thousand dollars a year? Would
you say the loss of the care of a husband should be measured in less terms? Isn't it true that two
heads are better than one? Is it correct that Mama can't be Papa? Is it an appeal to emotions
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to suggest that joint decisions between man and wife can enter very critically into the economics
of the family? No, indeed, each of these elements is properly recognized by the law and when
properly considered under this evidence proves our requested damages to be conservative and fair.
Indeed, as has been demonstrated, Mr. Quick's proved earnings and probable expected earnings
over his life expectancy would total almost $400,000. Certainly a failure here to award Mrs.
Quick in her own right just in actual earnings and anticipated earnings over $200,000 would be
tantamount to legal larceny. Because she certainly had a right to her one-half community interest
in those earnings."
